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OPINION OF THE COURT  
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge 
 
 This appeal arises from a putative class action in which 
Hartig Drug Company Inc. (“Hartig”) filed a complaint 
against Senju Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. (“Senju”), Kyorin 
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. (“Kyorin”), and Allergan Inc. 
(“Allergan”) (collectively, the “Defendants”), alleging 
antitrust violations involving medicated eyedrops 
manufactured by the Defendants.  Hartig argues that the 
Defendants’ wrongful suppression of generic competition 
resulted in supracompetitive pricing of those eyedrops.  
Although not a direct purchaser of the medications, Hartig 
claims it has standing to sue because of an assignment of 
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rights from AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation 
(“Amerisource”) which is a direct purchaser. 
 
 The District Court dismissed Hartig’s complaint under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  In its opinion, the Court ruled that an 
anti-assignment clause in a distribution agreement between 
Allergan and Amerisource barred any assignment of antitrust 
claims from Amerisource to Hartig, leaving Hartig without 
standing to sue and divesting the Court of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  We conclude that the District Court erred in 
treating antitrust standing as an issue of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  Accordingly, we will vacate and remand for 
further proceedings. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Factual Background1  
 Kyorin researchers developed an antibiotic called 
gatifloxacin and, in 1990, were awarded a patent on the drug.  
In 1997, Kyorin licensed Senju to develop, manufacture, and 
commercialize ophthalmic solutions containing gatifloxacin.  
Later, in 2001, Senju researchers obtained U.S. Patent No. 
6,333,045 (the “’045 Patent”) claiming aqueous liquid 
pharmaceutical compositions containing gatifloxacin and 
                                              
1 As explained in greater detail hereafter, it was error 
for the District Court to dismiss the action under Rule 
12(b)(1).  Treating the motion to dismiss as one under Rule 
12(b)(6), we recount the facts as alleged by the non-movant, 
Hartig, accepting them as true.  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 
578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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methods of utilizing them.  The named inventors on that 
patent assigned their rights to Kyorin and Senju jointly.   
 
 Kyorin and Senju also “licensed to Allergan the right – 
including a license under the ’045 [P]atent – to market 
aqueous liquid gatifloxacin ophthalmic products in the United 
States.”  (A33.)  Allergan filed New Drug Applications 
(“NDAs”) with the Food and Drug Administration for a 0.3% 
gatifloxacin solution (branded “Zymar”), and for a 0.5% 
gatifloxacin solution (branded “Zymaxid”); those NDAs were 
approved in 2003 and 2010 respectively.  Amerisource 
subsequently began purchasing Zymar and Zymaxid eyedrops 
directly from the Defendants and selling them to Hartig, an 
Iowa-based drug store chain.     
 
 Hartig alleged that the Defendants engaged in a 
number of illegal practices to prevent or delay the 
introduction into the market of generic alternatives to Zymar 
and Zymaxid.2  First, the Defendants filed a baseless lawsuit 
against another pharmaceutical company, Apotex, claiming 
patent infringement and delaying FDA approval of that 
company’s generic version of Zymar.  Next, the Defendants 
engaged in so-called “product hopping” (A35) – discouraging 
doctors from prescribing generic alternatives to the original 
0.3% Zymar eyedrops by phasing out that product in favor of 
“new” 0.5% Zymaxid eyedrops.  To buy time for that shift in 
marketing strategy, the Defendants prolonged the Apotex 
                                              
2 We deliberately refer to the Defendants collectively 
in describing the alleged anticompetitive conduct, as Hartig 
claims that all the Defendants, and not merely Allergan, 
engaged in such conduct. 
7 
 
litigation by filing a frivolous motion for a new trial.  They 
also asked the United States Patent and Trademark Office to 
reexamine claims of the ’045 Patent, but failed to disclose 
material information both from the trial record in the Apotex 
case and from their own expert that undermined their 
reexamination claims.  After the FDA approved Apotex’s 
0.3% gatifloxacin eyedrops, the Defendants sued Apotex a 
second time.  Although the courts ultimately held that the 
Defendants’ suit was barred by claim preclusion, Apotex was 
deterred from launching a generic competitor to Zymar.  
Since then, the Defendants have filed numerous lawsuits 
against competing drug manufacturers to bar the market entry 
of generic equivalents to both Zymar and Zymaxid.   
B. Procedural Background 
 Hartig filed its complaint in the United States District 
Court for the District of Delaware on June 6, 2014.  Styled as 
a class action, the complaint alleged that, were it not for the 
Defendants’ violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, generic 
versions of the gatifloxacin eyedrops would have been sold 
after Kyorin’s patent on gatifloxacin expired in 2010.3  Hartig 
alleged that the “Defendants’ unlawful scheme effectively 
denied direct purchasers of Zymar and Zymaxid the benefits 
                                              
3 The complaint alleges that Apotex, when it filed its 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) for a 0.3% 
gatifloxacin ophthalmic solution, certified that it would not 
market that product until Kyorin’s patent expired on June 15, 
2010, and Apotex notified the Defendants that its proposed 
ANDA product would not infringe on any valid claim of the 
separate ’045 Patent.  The complaint also alleges that the 
Defendants knew that the claims of the ’045 Patent were 
invalid as obvious.   
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of competition and of less expensive, generic versions.  As a 
result, [Hartig] and members of the Class … have paid 
supracompetitive prices for Zymar and Zymaxid and 
[Zymaxid’s] generic equivalent[].”4  (A24.)   
 
 The complaint acknowledged that Hartig was only an 
indirect purchaser of the two gatifloxacin products and that 
Hartig obtained the products through Amerisource, a direct 
purchaser.  That point was – and is – significant because, 
under the so-called “direct purchaser rule” recognized in 
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), a direct 
purchaser of a product has standing to sue under federal 
antitrust statutes whereas an indirect purchaser does not.  
Nevertheless, the complaint alleged that Amerisource had 
entered an assignment agreement with Hartig that 
 
conveyed, assigned, and transferred to Hartig all 
of its rights, title and interest in and to all causes 
of action it may have against Defendants under 
the antitrust laws of the United States or of any 
state arising out of or relating to Amerisource’s 
purchase of Zymar and Zymaxid to the extent 
                                              
4 Specifically, Hartig alleged that “Defendants’ 
anticompetitive actions delayed the entry of any generic 
competition from the market for over three years (at least 
from June 15, 2010 until October 3, 2013), and has limited 
generic competition even today to a single generic competitor 
offering a generic to Zymaxid only.”  (A48.) 
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such product was subsequently resold to Hartig 
… .5 
(A24-25 ¶ 9.) 
 
 Allergan responded to Hartig’s suit by filing a motion 
to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Kyorin and Senju jointly 
filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.6  Allergan’s 
12(b)(1) motion argued that Hartig lacked “[s]tanding to sue 
under the antitrust laws” because an anti-assignment clause in 
the Distribution Services Agreement (“DSA”) that Allergan 
had with Amerisource expressly prohibited either party from 
assigning the agreement or related rights and obligations 
without prior written consent from the other party.  Hartig v. 
Senju, et al., D. Del., CA No. 14-719-SLR Docket Item 
                                              
5 The Defendants contend that Hartig failed to 
establish the existence of the assignment agreement.  
Because, as we ultimately conclude, the District Court should 
have considered Allergan’s motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) rather than Rule 12(b)(1), the Court was obligated to 
accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and view 
them in the light most favorable to Hartig.  See Foglia v. 
Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 
2014).  Thus, even without the introduction of a written copy 
of the assignment agreement, the complaint’s allegation that 
an assignment of antitrust rights had occurred suffices at this 
stage of the proceedings. 
6 Allergan subsequently joined that 12(b)(6) motion as 
well.   
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(“D.I.”) 15, at 4; see id., at 5-9.  The DSA is not mentioned in 
Hartig’s complaint, but it was appended to Allergan’s motion 
to dismiss as an exhibit to a declaration from one of 
Allergan’s corporate officers, a Mr. Kafer.  The anti-
assignment clause of the DSA provides as follows:  
 
This Agreement may not be assigned by either 
party without the prior written consent of the 
other party.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, 
either party may assign its rights and 
obligations hereunder without the consent of the 
other party to a subsidiary or affiliate or to an 
entity which purchases all or substantially all of 
the assigning party’s stock or assets or acquires 
control of the assigning party, whether by 
merger, consolidation or any other means. 
(A108-109 § 14.b.)  The Kafer declaration stated that Hartig 
was not a direct purchaser from Allergan and that 
Amerisource had not sought or obtained written consent from 
Allergan for the alleged assignment, as purportedly required 
by the DSA’s anti-assignment clause.     
 
 After briefing on both the 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) 
motions, the District Court granted Allergan’s 12(b)(1) 
motion and, in an order dated August 19, 2015, dismissed the 
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The District 
Court relied on the anti-assignment clause in the DSA to 
conclude that Hartig lacked standing, reasoning that the 
clause’s prohibition applied to antitrust claims and therefore 
barred the assignment of the very claims on which Hartig’s 
standing relied.  Hartig timely appealed.  Later, a group of 
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seven drug retailers joined the appeal as amici curiae in 
support of Hartig.7   
II. DISCUSSION8 
 
A. The Appropriateness of Review under Rule 
 12(b)(1) 
 
 The parties have not challenged the District Court’s 
decision to address antitrust standing as a question of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Rather, it is the amici who contend that 
Allergan’s anti-assignment argument implicated only antitrust 
standing and that such standing is different from Article III 
standing, so that the District Court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction has never been rightly in question.   
 
 An amicus normally “cannot expand the scope of an 
appeal with issues not presented by the parties on appeal,” 
Nuveen Mun. Tr. ex rel. Nuveen High Yield Mun. Bond Fund 
                                              
7 The amici are Walgreen Co., The Kroger Co., 
Safeway Inc., Albertson’s LLC, HEB Grocery Company LP, 
CVS Health Corporation, and Rite Aid Corporation.   
8 The District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is the 
primary issue in this appeal.  We have appellate jurisdiction 
to review the final decision of the District Court pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The question of whether the District Court 
had subject matter jurisdiction is an issue of law that we 
review de novo.  In re Phar-Mor, Inc. Sec. Litig., 172 F.3d 
270, 273 (3d Cir. 1999).  Likewise, the determination of a 
contract’s legal effect is a question of law subject to plenary 
review.  Ram Constr. Co. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 
1049, 1053 (3d Cir. 1984). 
12 
 
v. WithumSmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283, 300 n.10 (3d Cir. 
2012), at least not “in cases where the parties are competently 
represented by counsel,” id. (quoting Universal City Studios, 
Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d Cir. 2001)).  And yet, 
federal courts “have an independent obligation to determine 
whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence 
of a challenge from any party.”  Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 
U.S. 500, 514 (2006); see also id. (affirming that “subject 
matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power to 
hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  A court’s non-waivable obligation 
to inquire into its own jurisdiction is most frequently 
exercised in the negative – that is, by questioning whether 
federal jurisdiction exists even when all parties assume that it 
does.  But “federal courts [also] have a strict duty to exercise 
the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress,” 
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996), 
and “have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction 
which is given, than to usurp that which is not,” id. (quoting 
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)).  
“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts 
on their own initiative,” irrespective of whether that policing 
of jurisdictional authority is voiced in the positive or the 
negative.  Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 
583 (1999).  Thus, regardless of the acquiescence or wishes 
of the parties, we must question whether the District Court 
properly treated antitrust standing as a jurisdictional issue 
under Rule 12(b)(1). 
 
 We recently confronted a similar jurisdictional issue – 
presented in a similar posture – in Group Against Smog and 
Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango Inc., 810 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2016).  
In that case, the District Court treated the “diligent 
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prosecution” bar of 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) as a limitation 
on its subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore dismissed the 
action under Rule 12(b)(1).  Id. at 121.  On appeal, amici 
curiae “raise[d] the issue of whether the diligent prosecution 
bar is jurisdictional and appropriately decided through a Rule 
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, or whether the diligent prosecution bar is 
nonjurisdictional and should be decided through a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”  Id. at 
122.  We noted that the appellants themselves had not raised 
that argument but had proceeded under the assumption that 
the bar was jurisdictional.  Id. at 122 n.5.  Nevertheless, we 
affirmed our independent obligation to “raise and decide 
jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or 
elect not to press,” id. (quoting Henderson ex rel. Henderson 
v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011)), an obligation made all 
the more significant because “branding a rule as going to a 
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction alters the normal operation 
of our adversarial system,” id. at 122 (internal quotation 
marks and brackets omitted).  We ultimately concluded that 
the District Court erred in treating the diligent prosecution bar 
as a jurisdictional limitation, and therefore should have dealt 
with the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) rather than 
Rule 12(b)(1).  Id. at 132. 
 
 Similarly, the amici here argue that the District Court 
erred by addressing Allergan’s motion to dismiss as a factual 
challenge to jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), and that the 
Court should have addressed the motion under Rule 12(b)(6) 
for failure to state a claim.  The distinction between Rules 
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) is important because the 12(b)(6) 
standard affords significantly more protections to a 
nonmovant.  “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court … 
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consider[s] only the complaint, exhibits attached to the 
complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly 
authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based 
upon these documents.”  Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 
230 (3d Cir. 2010).  Moreover, the court is “required to 
accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after 
construing them in the light most favorable to the 
nonmovant.”  Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 
153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and citations 
omitted).   
 
 A Rule 12(b)(1) attack can be a very different matter.  
A facial 12(b)(1) challenge, which attacks the complaint on 
its face without contesting its alleged facts, is like a 12(b)(6) 
motion in requiring the court to “consider the allegations of 
the complaint as true.”  Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 
294, 302 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  But a factual 12(b)(1) challenge attacks allegations 
underlying the assertion of jurisdiction in the complaint, and 
it allows the defendant to present competing facts.  
Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d 
Cir. 2014).  When considering a factual challenge, “the 
plaintiff [has] the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact 
exist,” the court “is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy 
itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case,” and 
“no presumptive truthfulness attaches to [the] plaintiff’s 
allegations … .” Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 
549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).  And, when reviewing a 
factual challenge, “a court may weigh and consider evidence 
outside the pleadings.”  Constitution Party of Pa., 757 F.3d at 
358 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, a 12(b)(1) 
factual challenge strips the plaintiff of the protections and 
15 
 
factual deference provided under 12(b)(6) review.  See, e.g., 
Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 348-50 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 
 In arguing the motions to dismiss in the District Court, 
no one questioned whether Allergan’s attack on Hartig’s 
antitrust standing should have been brought under Rule 
12(b)(6) instead of as a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction 
under Rule 12(b)(1).  As mentioned above, it is the amici who 
have raised the question on appeal.  Remarkably, Hartig 
neglects to address the argument at all, except to 
acknowledge that the amici have raised it.  Even at oral 
argument, when squarely faced with the question, Hartig’s 
counsel did not ask for consideration under 12(b)(6) but 
voiced an apparent preference to confront Allergan’s 12(b)(1) 
challenge head-on – that is, by reaching the issue of whether 
the DSA precluded the assignment of Amerisource’s antitrust 
causes of action.  Nevertheless, in keeping with our 
independent obligation to consider the boundaries of subject 
matter jurisdiction, we conclude that the District Court should 
have treated antitrust standing not as an Article III 
jurisdictional issue, but rather as a merits issue, and thus 
should have resolved the motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) rather than Rule 12(b)(1). 
 
B. Article III Standing versus Antitrust 
 Standing 
 
 To meet the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of 
Article III standing, a plaintiff invoking federal jurisdiction 
bears the burden of establishing three elements, as set forth in 
the now familiar case of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  First, it must establish that it has 
suffered an “injury in fact,” meaning a concrete and 
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particularized invasion of a legally protected interest.  Id.  
Second, it must establish a “causal connection between the 
injury and the conduct complained of – the injury has to be 
fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and 
not the result of the independent action of some third party 
not before the court.”  Id. (internal quotation and editorial 
marks omitted).  Third, it must show a likelihood “that the 
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”  Id. at 561 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Article III standing is 
essential to federal subject matter jurisdiction and is thus “a 
threshold issue that must be addressed before considering 
issues of prudential standing.”  Miller v. Nissan Motor 
Acceptance Corp., 362 F.3d 209, 221 n.16 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(citation omitted). 
 
 In a case like this, even after a plaintiff has established 
Article III standing, antitrust standing remains as a 
prerequisite to suit, “‘focus[ing] on the nature of the 
plaintiff’s alleged injury,’ [and] asking ‘whether it is of the 
type that the antitrust statute was intended to forestall.’”  
Barton & Pittinos, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 118 
F.3d 178, 181 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Associated Gen. 
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 
459 U.S. 519, 538, 540 (1983)).   
 
If the injury is not of the requisite type, even 
though the would-be plaintiff may have suffered 
an injury as a result of conduct that violated the 
antitrust laws, he or she has no standing to bring 
a private action under the antitrust laws to 
recover for it. … Therefore, the plaintiff might 
be able to sue under a different statute or 
common law rule … but the plaintiff [would 
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have] no standing to sue under the antitrust 
laws.  
Id. 
 That Article III standing and antitrust standing both 
employ the term “standing” tends to confuse matters.  The 
two concepts are distinct, with the former implicating a 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction and the latter affecting only 
the plaintiff’s ability to succeed on the merits.  In Ethypharm 
S.A. France v. Abbott Laboratories, we explained that Article 
III standing is of constitutional and hence jurisdictional 
consequence, while antitrust standing is not: 
 
Constitutional standing is augmented by 
consideration of prudential limitations.  For 
plaintiffs suing under federal antitrust laws, one 
of the prudential limitations is the requirement 
of antitrust standing.  It does not affect the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the court, as 
Article III standing does, but prevents a plaintiff 
from recovering under the antitrust laws. 
707 F.3d 223, 232 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks, 
footnotes, and citations omitted).  The difference between 
Article III standing and antitrust standing is apparent from the 
Supreme Court’s explanation of the direct purchaser rule in 
Illinois Brick, which recognized that, although indirect 
purchasers “may have been actually injured by antitrust 
violations” through passed-on overcharges, the “legislative 
purpose[s]” underlying the antitrust statutes would still be 
better served by limiting recovery to the direct purchasers 
paying those overcharges in the first instance.  431 U.S. at 
746; see generally id. at 737-47.  Thus, the direct purchaser 
rule represents a policy decision intended to aid the purposes 
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of the antitrust statutes and does not speak to whether there is 
an Article III case or controversy. 
 
 Sometimes antitrust standing is discussed in terms of 
“statutory standing.”  See Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 
273, 307 n.35 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (clarifying that the 
term “statutory standing” refers “to the possession of a viable 
claim or right to relief, not to a jurisdictional requirement”).  
Again, however, labels can be misleading.  A lack of 
“statutory standing” means the absence of a valid cause of 
action under a statute, but it “does not implicate subject-
matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s statutory or constitutional 
power to adjudicate the case.”  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.4 (2014) 
(original emphasis) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
“Accordingly, statutory standing is simply another element of 
proof for an antitrust claim, rather than a predicate for 
asserting a claim in the first place.”  Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 
307.  In the end, it does not matter “whether the [antitrust] 
standing inquiry is characterized as ‘prudential’ or ‘statutory’ 
… because neither deprives us of Article III jurisdiction and 
both bar a plaintiff’s ability to recover.”  Ethypharm, 707 
F.3d at 232 n.17. 
 
 At oral argument before us, the Defendants continued 
to press the position that the DSA’s anti-assignment clause 
implicated Article III standing.  But that is simply not so.  
Allergan’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) was always 
premised, at bottom, on Hartig’s purported lack of antitrust 
standing.  True, Allergan framed its 12(b)(1) motion in terms 
of Article III standing, referring to the “case-or-controversy 
requirement of Article III.”  D.I. 15, at 4 (quoting Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 560).  But the substance of Allergan’s argument 
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focused solely on the Supreme Court’s holding in Illinois 
Brick that an indirect purchaser lacks “[s]tanding to sue under 
the antitrust laws.”9  Id.   
 
 We have repeatedly interpreted Illinois Brick and its 
progeny as addressing not the threshold question of whether 
an indirect purchaser has Article III standing to sue in federal 
court at all, but rather the subsequent question of whether 
such a purchaser has standing to recover under federal 
antitrust statutes.  See, e.g., Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen 
Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 79 (3d Cir. 2011) (“In Illinois Brick, the 
Supreme Court held that only direct purchasers have standing 
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.”); Howard Hess Dental 
Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 424 F.3d 363, 366 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (“Illinois Brick determined that direct purchasers 
are the only parties ‘injured’ in a manner that permits them to 
recover damages.  It thus held that indirect purchaser 
plaintiffs do not have statutory standing to recover damages 
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.”) (internal citations 
omitted); Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 
958, 963 (3d Cir. 1983) (identifying Illinois Brick as 
                                              
9 Indeed, Allergan’s legal argument on this point was 
as follows: 
Standing to sue under the antitrust laws is 
limited to parties that were direct purchasers of 
the product at issue.  Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 746.  
Indirect purchasers – that is, parties who 
allegedly paid an overcharge that was passed on 
by a party that made a purchase directly from 
the defendants – lack standing. 
D.I. 15, at 4-5. 
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recognizing “that there are certain classes of plaintiffs who, 
although able to trace an injury to an antitrust violation, are 
generally not within the group of private attorneys general 
Congress created to enforce the antitrust laws under section 
4”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 Forced to confront the distinction between 
constitutional and antitrust standing, the Defendants now 
attempt to change the discussion by arguing that Hartig’s 
assertion of antitrust standing via assignment was actually a 
fatal misstep, somehow undermining its ability to establish 
constitutional standing.  In a supplemental filing, they 
endeavor to reformulate the arguments that Allergan made in 
the 12(b)(1) motion in the District Court, saying, 
 
Had Hartig sued for its own injury – the alleged 
overcharge it paid to Amerisource – Allergan 
would have moved to dismiss for lack of 
antitrust standing under Rule 12(b)(6).  Because 
Hartig sued for someone else’s injury – the 
alleged overcharge paid by Amerisource – 
Allergan properly moved under Rule 12(b)(1) 
advancing a constitutional standing argument. 
(Defendants’ Letter Dated June 24, 2016, at 2.)  This is a 
wholly new argument.  Allergan’s motion to dismiss was 
always premised upon Hartig’s lack of antitrust standing as an 
indirect purchaser, which was an Illinois Brick argument and 
not a constitutional challenge to standing.  See D.I. 15, at 4-5 
(“Indirect purchasers … lack standing.” (citing Illinois Brick, 
431 U.S. at 746)); see also id. at 5 n.1 (urging that, even if the 
District Court were to consider Allergan’s motion under Rule 
12(b)(6), the Court could still consider the DSA “in deciding 
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whether Hartig satisfies the indispensable element of antitrust 
standing” (emphasis added)).   
 
But, even ignoring that none of the Defendants 
previously made the argument that the assignment from 
Amerisource to Hartig created a problem of constitutional 
magnitude, the substance of the Defendants’ new argument is 
unpersuasive.  For purposes of constitutional standing, the 
underlying questions raised by the argument are captured in 
the first two of the well-known Lujan factors.10  In particular, 
those questions are whether Hartig has suffered an injury in 
fact and whether that injury is fairly traceable to the 
Defendants.  On these matters, the distinction between direct 
and indirect purchasers is of little relevance.11   
 
 Hartig certainly has alleged such an injury.  Its 
complaint asserted that it bought Zymar and Zymaxid from 
Amerisource, which in turn purchased those products from 
the Defendants.  (A24-25.)  Thus, notwithstanding that the 
“direct purchaser rule” from Illinois Brick would disqualify 
Hartig from serving as a private attorney general under the 
                                              
10 The third element from Lujan, redressibility, is not 
raised by the Defendants’ new Article III standing argument. 
11 We are careful not to say that the distinction 
between direct and indirect purchasers is wholly irrelevant to 
the question of Article III standing, since an indirect 
purchaser could be so remote as to be unable to meet its 
burden of establishing either that it had suffered an injury in 
fact or that such injury was fairly traceable to the defendant’s 
actions. 
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antitrust statutes,12 Hartig’s allegations are that it was in fact 
harmed by the downstream effects of the Defendants’ 
anticompetitive behavior.  Indeed, while the Defendants 
argued that Hartig did not assert its own injuries, in the same 
breath they recognized that Hartig has “alleged” it paid 
“overcharge[s]” for the Zymar and Zymaxid products.  
(Defendants’ Letter Dated June 24, 2016, at 2.)  The 
complaint plainly and repeatedly emphasizes that, as a result 
of the Defendants’ anticompetitive behavior in suppressing 
generic equivalents of Zymar and Zymaxid, Hartig has paid 
inflated prices for those products.13  Those allegations, 
                                              
12 That disqualification may or may not be overcome 
by the alleged assignment from Amerisource.  That is a 
question for the District Court in the first instance. 
13 See A24 ¶ 8 (“Defendants’ unlawful scheme 
effectively denied direct purchasers of Zymar and Zymaxid 
the benefits of competition and of less expensive, generic 
versions.  As a result, Plaintiff [Hartig] … ha[s] paid 
supracompetitive prices for Zymar and Zymaxid and its 
generic equivalents.”); A48 ¶ 124 (“Defendants’ 
anticompetitive actions resulted in Plaintiff [Hartig] … 
paying higher prices for gatifloxacin ophthalmic formulations 
than [it] would have paid if a generic equivalent to Zymar and 
Zymaxid had been available throughout the class period.”); 
A51 ¶ 141 (same); A50 ¶¶ 136-37 (alleging that, “[a]s a result 
of the Defendants’ illegal conduct,” Hartig and other 
“purchasers of Zymar and Zymaxid have sustained substantial 
losses and damage to their business and property in the form 
of overcharges”); A52 ¶ 143 (asserting that, “as a direct and 
proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct,” Hartig 
and other class members “paid artificially inflated prices for 
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together with the complaint’s specific descriptions of 
anticompetitive behavior indulged in by the Defendants, are 
sufficient to establish a judicially redressable injury-in-fact 
that is fairly traceable to the Defendants – or, in other words, 
an Article III case or controversy. 
 
 We recognize that the conflation of Article III standing 
with antitrust standing may arise, at least in part, from those 
doctrines’ overlap in both the factual questions they can 
involve and in their terminology.  Nevertheless, we again 
caution against expanding Rule 12(b)(1) “beyond its proper 
purpose,” and reaffirm that, in general, “Rule 12(b)(6) – with 
its attendant procedural and substantive protections for 
plaintiffs – is the proper vehicle for the early testing of a 
plaintiff’s claims.”  Davis, 824 F.3d at 348-49.14  As we 
                                                                                                     
Zymar and Zymaxid and were deprived of the benefits of 
earlier and robust competition from cheaper generic versions 
of those products”); A55-56 ¶¶ 164-65 (claiming that, “[b]ut 
for Defendants’ unlawful actions,” Hartig “would have 
benefitted from the presence of [] low-cost generic … 
alternative[s]” to Zymar and Zymaxid that the Defendants’ 
embattled competitors “could and would have supplied”); 
A57 ¶¶ 177-78 (same); A59 ¶¶ 190-91 (same). 
14 We have repeatedly cautioned against 
allowing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction to be turned 
into an attack on the merits.  Caution is 
necessary because the standards governing the 
two rules differ markedly, as Rule 12(b)(6) 
provides greater procedural safeguards for 
plaintiffs than does Rule 12(b)(1).  First, 
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recently reaffirmed in Davis v. Wells Fargo, “dismissal via a 
Rule 12(b)(1) factual challenge to standing should be granted 
                                                                                                     
proceeding under Rule 12(b)(1) inverts the 
burden of persuasion.  When presenting a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, the defendant bears the burden 
to show that the plaintiff has not stated a claim.  
But under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff must 
prove the court has subject matter jurisdiction.  
The two rules also treat the complaint’s factual 
allegations very differently.  Unlike Rule 
12(b)(6), under which a defendant cannot 
contest the plaintiff’s factual allegations, Rule 
12(b)(1) allows a defendant to attack the 
allegations in the complaint and submit contrary 
evidence in its effort to show that the court 
lacks jurisdiction.  Thus, improper 
consideration of a merits question under Rule 
12(b)(1) significantly raises both the factual and 
legal burden on the plaintiff.  Given the 
differences between the two rules, a plaintiff 
may be prejudiced if what is, in essence, a Rule 
12(b)(6) challenge to the complaint is treated as 
a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. 
Davis, 824 F.3d at 348–49 (internal citations, quotation 
marks, and brackets omitted).  Because Rule 12(b)(6) is the 
preferred mechanism for the early testing of a plaintiff’s 
claims, and because defendants are nevertheless likely to 
prefer the relaxed standards of Rule 12(b)(1), district courts 
confronted with arguments framed as 12(b)(1) challenges to 
jurisdiction should approach those arguments with particular 
care. 
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sparingly,” id. at 350, and it is only the “unusual” case that 
will be properly dismissed under 12(b)(1) “when the facts 
necessary to succeed on the merits are at least in part the 
same as must be alleged or proven to withstand jurisdictional 
attacks,” id. (citing Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 892) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In this case, Hartig has not alleged 
claims “so … completely devoid of merit as to not involve a 
federal controversy.”  Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing Ass’n, 
Inc., 816 F.2d 895, 899 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Oneida 
Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 
(1974)).  On the contrary, it had Article III standing sufficient 
to give the District Court subject matter jurisdiction, and thus 
a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) was not legitimately in play. 
 
C. Review Under Rule 12(b)(6) Rather than 
 Rule 12(b)(1) 
 Because “we may affirm on any basis supported by the 
record,” we next consider whether the District Court could 
have granted Allergan’s motion to dismiss under the Rule 
12(b)(6) framework.  Davis, 824 F.3d at 350.  The 
Defendants admit that Allergan, in styling its Rule 12(b)(1) 
argument as one of constitutional standing, “did not make an 
argument in the alternative under Rule 12(b)(6).”  
(Defendants’ Letter Dated June 24, 2016, at 2 n.1.)  Even had 
the Court treated the 12(b)(1) motion in the alternative as the 
12(b)(6) motion that it actually was, the decision would 
nonetheless be unsound because the Court relied upon the 
DSA, whereas it should have measured Allergan’s motion 
primarily “against the bare allegations of the complaint.”  JM 
Mech. Corp. v. HUD, 716 F.2d 190, 196-97 (3d Cir. 1983).  
As mentioned above, for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), a court 
“must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the 
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complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly 
authentic documents if the complaint’s claims are based upon 
these documents.”  Mayer, 605 F.3d at 230.   
 
 Allergan has argued that the DSA can be considered in 
a 12(b)(6) analysis because it is a document “integral to or 
explicitly relied upon in the complaint.”  D.I. 15, at 5 n.1 
(quoting Warren Gen. Hosp., 643 F.3d at 82 n.4).  Not so.  
The DSA was never mentioned in Hartig’s complaint, was 
not attached to the complaint, was not a matter of public 
record,15 and did not form a basis for any of the claims.16  
Although Allergan cites authority suggesting that the District 
Court could have considered the DSA “to determine whether 
the plaintiff was a direct purchaser,” id., Hartig’s complaint 
readily acknowledged that the company was an indirect 
purchaser, and instead predicated its antitrust standing on an 
assignment from Amerisource, itself a direct purchaser.  Rule 
12(b)(6) requires that those specific allegations be accepted as 
true and viewed in the light most favorable to Hartig.  Thus, 
we cannot say that the DSA was integral to Hartig’s claims.  
It is integral only to the Defendants’ attack on those claims.  
                                              
15 In fact, for purposes of this appeal, the DSA has 
been filed separately under seal, and it states at the bottom of 
every page that it is “confidential” and “not to be shared with 
any third party.”  (A100-15.)   
16 The complaint does not mention Amerisource at all 
except for the single paragraph alleging that (1) Amerisource 
“directly purchased branded Zymar and Zymaxid from 
Defendants” (A25 ¶9), (2) Hartig purchased those same drugs 
from Amerisource, and (3) Amerisource assigned its antitrust 
rights to Hartig. 
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Because the DSA is extrinsic to the complaint, the District 
Court could not have properly considered it for purposes of a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and, without the DSA, 
Allergan’s entire challenge to the validity of Amerisource’s 
assignment lacks a foundation. 
 
 For the District Court to have considered documents 
that, like the DSA, lie outside the bounds of the complaint, it 
would have had to do so by “convert[ing the 12(b)(6) motion] 
into a summary judgment proceeding and afford[ing] the 
plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to a summary judgment motion by Rule 56.”  JM 
Mech. Corp., 716 F.2d at 197; see also Rose v. Bartle, 871 
F.2d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 1989) (“We have held that it is 
reversible error for a district court to convert a motion under 
Rule 12(b)(6) … into a motion for summary judgment unless 
the court provides notice of its intention to convert the motion 
and allows an opportunity to submit materials admissible in a 
summary judgment proceeding or allows a hearing.”).  
Because the District Court considered the DSA under Rule 
12(b)(1), none of those procedures were followed.  It may be, 
as the Defendants urge, that “Hartig would not have objected 
to the district court considering the DSA on a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion.”  (Defendants’ Letter Dated June 24, 2016, at 2 n.1.)  
Based on the record before us, though, that assent is still 
theoretical: Allergan did not proffer its anti-assignment 
argument in the alternative as grounds for dismissal under 
Rule 12(b)(6); the District Court did not consider the DSA 
under that framework; and Hartig thus had no occasion to 
formally waive any of its 12(b)(6) protections or to respond, 
after proper notice, to a converted motion for summary 
judgment.  We will not affirm on such a record, but instead 
will remand so that the parties may have the opportunity to 
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make their arguments under the proper procedural 
framework, with its attendant safeguards. 
 
 Once the correct procedures have been followed, the 
District Court may have occasion to interpret the effect of the 
DSA.  Therefore, considerations of judicial economy merit 
our noting some doubt about the Court’s interpretation of the 
DSA as barring the assignment of antitrust causes of action.   
 
 In light of the DSA’s choice-of-law provision, the 
District Court correctly looked to Pennsylvania law to 
determine the DSA’s effect, but it may have misstepped in its 
choice of interpretive principles.  It cited Crawford Central 
School District v. Commonwealth, 888 A.2d 616, 623 (Pa. 
2005), for the idea that “an assignment will ordinarily be 
construed in accordance with the rules governing contract 
interpretation and the circumstances surrounding the 
execution of the assignment document.”  In Pennsylvania, the 
“[c]onsideration of the surrounding circumstances” does not 
appear to be a general principle of contract law, U.S. Nat’l 
Bank in Johnstown v. Campbell, 47 A.2d 697, 700 (Pa. 1946), 
but rather has developed as a principle of interpretation 
specific to assignments.  See Horbal v. Moxham Nat’l Bank, 
697 A.2d 577, 583 (Pa. 2001) (“In interpreting an assignment, 
it will ordinarily be construed in accordance with the rules of 
construction governing contracts and the circumstances 
surrounding the execution of the assignment document.”).  
Perhaps because this case implicated an assignment, the 
District Court considered not only the language of the DSA, 
but also expressly considered the “circumstances” 
surrounding that agreement.  (A11 n.4.)  The problem with 
that approach is that the Court was not interpreting an 
assignment.  The DSA, not the assignment agreement, was 
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under scrutiny, and the DSA is simply a contract, not an 
assignment.  Thus, it seems likely that Pennsylvania’s general 
principles of contract interpretation should have applied, 
which focus on the “clear and unambiguous” language of an 
agreement “as manifestly expressed, rather than as, perhaps, 
silently intended.”17  Amoco Oil Co. v. Snyder, 478 A.2d 795, 
798 (Pa. 1984) (original emphasis) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also LJL Transp., Inc. v Pilot Air Freight Corp., 
962 A.2d 639, 647 (Pa. 2009) (“When the words of an 
agreement are clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties 
is to be ascertained from the language used in the agreement, 
which will be given its commonly accepted and plain 
meaning.” (internal citations omitted)).  But that is a question 
for the District Court to address, if necessary, on remand. 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
 We part from the District Court in its treatment of 
antitrust standing as a factual challenge to subject matter 
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1),  and we reject the 
proposition that the Court could have considered the extrinsic 
                                              
17 The DSA’s limitation on assignments provides that 
“[t]his Agreement may not be assigned” without prior written 
consent, but that “either party may assign its rights and 
obligations hereunder” without written consent if the 
assignment is to a “subsidiary or affiliate.”  (A108 (emphasis 
added).)  Because Amerisource’s antitrust causes of action 
arise by statute, there is a serious argument that they do not 
fall within the DSA’s plain language limiting assignment of 
“rights and obligations hereunder” – that is, they arise by 
operation of an extrinsic legal regime rather than by contract.   
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evidence of the DSA’s anti-assignment clause under Rule 
12(b)(6).  The case should not have been dismissed pursuant 
to Allergan’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion.  Therefore, we will 
vacate the order of dismissal and remand for further 
proceedings. 
